Common Property Regime in an Alpine Community

         We have been lucky enough to have had the wonderful opportunity to spend the last few days in the glorious alpine village of Cavalese. I took full advantage of this time, soaking in the beauty of the mountain village and crossing off one of the highlighted points on my bucket list: ski in the Alps. 

How could this possibly be an Economics class, you ask? Well, it turns out these particular mountains are home to more than just powder days. They hold the Magnifica Communita de Fiemme (MCF), a forest managed by an intricate common property regime. We were given the opportunity to learn about this rarity throughout our time in Cavalese, hearing from speakers involved in the management of the MCF and reading and discussing articles focused on the concept of common property regimes. Our article, “Common property regimes in the forest: just a relic from the past?” by Margaret McKean and Elinor Ostrom, defined common property regimes, examined when this method was favored over privatization of resources, and outlined ten necessities for a successful regime.

Three terms commonly misused interchangeably to refer to an arrangement like the MCF are common pool resources, common property, and common property regime/arrangements. However, they are not synonymous. “Common pool resources” refers to the physical qualities of a resource or resource system, not the social constructs which surround it. The second term, common property, has a rather ironic name because it really is not property at all but instead an open access resource available to everyone. Most people are well aware of the inefficiency that comes with common property. For those that are not, I feel Garrett Hardin said it best when he wrote “Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.” It is because of this that open access only works when there is little need to manage the resource at all: when the demand is too low to make any difference. Common property regimes, of which the MCF is an example, are ways of privatizing resources without dividing it into pieces. This method of management of a common pool resource can limit or eliminate the inefficiencies associated with the tragedy of the commons by giving the rights to a group of people and having them internalize the responsibility for its use.  The MCF is a great example of this by giving the responsibility of the management of the forest to the participating community members.

There are five situations which make a common property regime more advantageous than privatization, and the MCF relates to all of them.
Indivisibility:  This alpine forest area, though not as obviously indivisible as the ocean or the sky, they must still be managed in large units to minimize inefficiency.

Uncertainty of locations of productive areas: Due to the vast area, it would be extremely difficult to fully determine where all the most productive areas of the MCF lie.

Efficiency through internalizing externalities: By uniting, neighboring villages cannot step on others’ toes when utilizing the forest as they can all work together to maximize utility as a unit, rather than gaining at the other’s expense.

Administrative efficiency: By electing a representative body to manage the resource, the communities can more easily find mutually beneficial policies. 

The reason that  the MCF has been so successful in keeping their common property arrangement going is that they follow each of McKean and Ostrom’s outlined necessities for success.

The communities who manage the MCF have the ability to organize and discuss without interference. (Thanks to a prince a few hundred years ago who felt he could not exploit the resource himself).

The boundaries of the forest are very clear, both legally and physically. Should anyone attempt to illegally take logs from the MCF, both parties will know their actions are illegal.

The criteria for membership of the MCF is very clear. (Though it is under debate at the moment, as it is currently 20 years of residency, but certain parties believe it takes 80 years to fully commit to the welfare of a community.)

The governing body of the MCF lends itself to being able to modify the rules over time, as illustrated in the membership criteria debate.

The MCF rules take into account the maximum sustainable yield of the area and do not attempt to over –log.

The rules the governing body puts into place are clear, and infractions are monitored and punished.

The democratic structure of the system lends itself to fairness, and easy mending of minor conflicts.

Considerable authority is broken down to smaller components, with two representative boards, one of 42 members and the other consisting of one representative from each community, totaling 11. 

It was such a treat to be able to enter into this community and hear from a first person perspective about this rare and complex system of resource management in one of the most beautiful parts of the world.